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Should Massachusetts Regionalize Public Health?

Eric W. Hayden
Abstract:
Amidst rising global concerns about bioterrorism and pandemic flu preparedness,
the delivery capacity and effectiveness of public health service assumes increased
importance and relevance. In the United States, the lack of a centralized, national
public health system has meant that “public health” is the primary responsibility
of state and local governments. Many states have established various types of
intrastate regional structures to deliver the range of on-going, occasional, and/or
episodic services that characterize the world of public health. However,
Massachusetts is not among them. Despite its global reputation as a pre-eminent
medical center, the state of Massachusetts has a highly balkanized public health
system, with a separate health department for each of its 351 cities and towns.
This structure reflects the state’s long-standing tradition of weak county
government and strong home rule. The result, however, is a state-wide public
health system characterized by strong local autonomy, lack of accountability, no
credentialing or licensure requirements, disparate delivery capabilities, increased
funding problems, and the real potential for ineffectiveness in the event of a
devastating disease or attack. This paper examines how public health is currently
organized and delivered both nationally and within Massachusetts, and it
concludes by identifying criteria and potential regionalization structures that could
lead to a more efficient and comprehensive public health delivery capability for
the state. The findings have relevance not only for Massachusetts but also any
state looking to improve the delivery of its public health services.

Introduction:
Massachusetts is a world renowned center of medical excellence, the home of world-class
training, delivery and research systems like Harvard University Medical School, the
Massachusetts General Hospital, and the Dana Farber Cancer Institute. However, the
state’s reputation as a “Medical Mecca” stems more from its success in treating and
curing disease rather than in preventing disease and protecting its populace from threats
to health and safety. In the United States, 99% of healthcare dollars are spent on the
former, and only 1% on the latter. It is the latter -the treatment of the broad community
rather than the individual- which comprises what is traditionally known as “public
health.”
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Amidst rising global concerns about preparedness for bioterrorism, pandemics, and
natural disasters, the delivery capacity of public health services assumes increased
importance world-wide. As demands and expectations rise, one can reasonably question
whether Massachusetts’s current public health mosaic -351 separate local health
departments, one for each of its cities and towns -offers the best infrastructure for
providing the range of on-going, occasional, and/or episodic services that characterize the
world of public health. Each of these separate health departments is, at least in theory,
responsible for delivering the same set of services whether to Boston (population
approaching 600,000) or Monroe, a town of about 100 in the state’s rural west. The
reality is quite different, as the larger municipalities generally meet most of their
responsibilities while scores of small towns throughout the rest of the state provide only
minimal services.
Is there a better way?
In the wake of September 11, 2001 (“9/11”), most states -including Massachusetts- have
established intrastate regional structures to manage and disperse federal emergency
preparedness funds. Could Massachusetts use this (or a similar) model as the basis for
re-structuring its public health delivery system into one that fosters the operating and
financial synergies available through multi-community collaborations? Might the public
health needs of the state’s 6.5 million residents be more effectively and efficiently
managed through, for example, a dozen or so regions rather than the current 351 separate
local departments?
Public health is not the only sector in Massachusetts where some form of regionalization
could facilitate synergies and cost savings. In its waning months, the Romney
administration began to push incentives to get small school districts to consolidate rather
than waste millions of tax payer dollars running their own separate, localized operations.
In the early months of the successor Patrick administration, there is some dialogue about
potential gains to be realized by a more regional approach to municipal services -for
example, combining the health insurance and/or pension management of towns as a
means of taking advantage of group discounts and/or efficiencies of scale. Including the
delivery of public health in this discussion deserves serious consideration.
As a means of fostering such a dialogue, this paper examines how public health is
currently organized and delivered both nationally and within Massachusetts, and it then
identifies alternative regionalization options that might improve the ability of
Massachusetts to respond to a major public health emergency. The implications could be
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significant not only for Massachusetts but also other states with town-based public health
structures.

The U.S. Public Health Structure:
Through the Tenth Amendment, the U.S. Constitution reserves to the individual states all
powers not otherwise either specifically given to the federal government (e.g., defense,
foreign diplomacy) or specifically denied the states (e.g., coining money, taxing imports
and exports). Retained by every state is the sovereign power to promote and protect the
health, safety, and welfare of its people. From the nation’s very beginning, the individual
states have used this power to develop necessary structures and organizations to prevent
epidemics and communicable diseases, to protect citizens from environmental hazards
and personal injury, to respond to health emergencies and disasters, and to promote
healthy behaviors. While the federal public health presence has grown considerably over
the years -for example, through the creation of the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention in 1946, Medicare and Medicaid in 1965, and most recently the Department
of Homeland Security- each state remains the primary bastion for protecting its citizens
from both acute and chronic threats to the public health. State laws, local ordinances and
regulations, licenses, and inspections are the legal means of implementation.
States carry out their range of public health functions through a wide variety of different
organizational structures, programs and services, staffing levels, and reporting
relationships. Ultimately, however, each state has an identifiable lead agency (e.g.,
Department of Public Health) with overall public health responsibility. In about twothirds of the states, that lead agency is free-standing and reports to the governor; in the
rest, it is part of a multipurpose health and/or human services agency. 1
The front line of public health delivery is the local health department, or LHD. Most
people know their LHD as the local entity that, among other things, provides both
preventative health interventions (e.g., immunizations, screenings for such maladies as
tuberculosis or high blood pressure, tobacco use prevention programs, school health
programs, and mental health services) and environmental protection services (e.g.,
restaurant inspections and regulation, septic inspections, water and milk safety, and/or air
pollution, insect, and rodent controls).
Nation-wide, there are some 3,000 LHDs. These are often -but certainly not alwaysstaffed by individuals with formal training in public health or medicine. LHDs operate in
every state but Rhode Island. They typically report to a local board of health, whose
members are usually appointed; less frequently, board members are elected by the public,
either to serve in this specific capacity or by virtue of having been elected to some other
position, such as a town selectman or member of the county council. In those instances
where the local board of health functions in more of an advisory (as opposed to
supervisory) capacity, the LHD reports to other parts of local or state government (for
example, the state health director, a country commissioner or executive, the city council,
or a town manager). 2
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Absent specific and consistent standards to guide their performance, the delivery capacity
of LHDs varies widely among communities. Reflecting the geopolitical and socioeconomic diversity of the areas they serve, LHDs run the gamut from comprehensive,
well-funded metropolitan operations dealing with hundreds of thousands (or even
millions) of citizens to barely functioning rural units serving a few hundred people.
Those that are unable to perform all public health functions on their own find other
means of accomplishing their tasks -for example, by turning to their state for help in
carrying out some functions and/or by partnering with local community organizations
(e.g., public or private health care providers, schools, businesses, media, and law
enforcement or public safety entities) or neighboring LHDs. At times, other government
entities provide certain public health functions (e.g., environmental health, emergency
medical, mental health, and/or substance abuse services) in close association with the
LHD. Ultimately, however, it is the LHD that is responsible -whether as leader,
supervisor, convener, partner, collaborator, enabler, or evaluator- for delivery of a
cohesive local public health system.
There are basically three general structures by which states manage public health
delivery:
• Decentralized (31 states) -where all LHDs are run by the local municipal
government
• Centralized (7 states) -where either all LHDs are run by the state or there are no
local entities (Rhode Island), where the state provides all local services
• Mixed (12 states) -where some LHDs are run by the state and some by the local
government
Nearly 80% of LHDs are units of local government (i.e., county, city, town), while the
rest are units of the state health agency. 3
Because of the predominance of county government in America and its role as a
convenient vehicle for down-streaming responsibilities to the local level, some 83 percent
of the nation’s LHDs serve county, multi-county, or city-county jurisdictions; the rest
serve towns and cities. 4 Because of their relatively large budgets, city health
departments often have a wider array of programs and services than their county
equivalents.

The Massachusetts Public Health Structure:
In much of New England, county government is notoriously weak and, for all intents and
purposes, non-existent. This is certainly true in Massachusetts, where the main function
of its 12 counties is managing corrections facilities, courts, and registries of deeds, and, in
some instances, public hospitals and/or golf courses. In contrast, the state’s town and city
government organization is particularly strong. This “home rule” bias reflects a longstanding belief that local matters should be handled at the lowest common political
denominator by officials familiar with local conditions. Accordingly, state statute
mandates that every city and town have its own health department responsible for
enforcing state sanitary and environmental codes, adopting reasonable local health
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ordinances, and carrying out preventive programs. 5 Backing statute is a significant body
of case law plus a host of local regulations. Meanwhile, the primary functions of the state
department of public health are dispersing emergency preparedness funds, promulgating
health-related regulations, and, when necessary, declaring a state of emergency.
As a result, this single state with little more than 2 percent of the nation’s total population
accounts for nearly 12 percent of its LHDs. Expressed geographically, the average
Massachusetts LHD covers an area of 30 square miles, compared to the 1,250 square
miles covered by each of the nation’s 3,000 LHDs. In terms of population served, each
of Massachusetts’s 351 LHDs serves an average of 18,500 people, compared to the
approximately 100,000 people served by each of the nation’s local health departments.
The development of public health policy, the delivery of related services, and the quality
of those services vary widely throughout Massachusetts. As one might expect, LHDs
anchored by major cities benefit from economies of scale and larger resources. By
contrast, the outliers suffer staff and funding constraints that restrict their main activities
to the most basic sanitation and housing services. The result is a fragmented state-wide
public health system where, as one state report has noted:
…there is no single view of the appropriate roles and responsibilities
of local…health [organizations]….[E]ach…has its own particular
set of responsibilities and ways of doing business, responding to widely
variable perceptions about public health priorities among local officials,
health professionals, and community residents who appear selectively
aware of public health issues depending principally on how these issues
affect the directly…[Likewise, the] data…show wide variability statewide
in the governance, composition, responsibilities, staffing, and financing of
local…health [organizations]… 6
Illustratively, boards may be elected or appointed, while some communities appoint a
commissioner of health who is then advised by an appointed committee of residents;
other municipalities ask their selectmen to fill the duties of a board of health. Board
members are typically volunteer citizens with their own full-time jobs; some of them are
healthcare professionals, but many are not; membership turnover is high. For towns large
enough to have a health department, staff may be voluntary (typically board of health
members) or paid; full- or part-time; with or without formal training in public health.
The state’s largest cities are able to support complex city health departments with
hundreds (even thousands) of employees, many with highly specialized skills. Further
complicating the consistency of state-wide public health delivery, Massachusetts is one of
the few states with no state-wide credentialing requirement for its local health officials.
Most public health funding comes from local tax revenues and fees. However, as newly
mandated obligations and responsibilities have been assigned (e.g., septic system
regulations, and tobacco education and enforcement programs) without any
commensurate increases in funding, budgets have become increasingly tight. LHDs
compete with local school, fire, and police departments for limited and frequently
diminished resources. Further constricting the ability of local government is the 1980
law that limits to 2 ½ percent the annual increase in a community’s tax levy (absent a
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voter override). Since so many municipalities are too small to provide a full range of
public health services, the Massachusetts Department of Public Health purchases many
such services from some 700 “vendors” -private contractors, community-based
organizations (e.g., visiting nurse associations), and agencies (e.g., local department or
public works) -that competitively bid for contracts. The contracts range from substance
abuse programs to routine sanitation inspections, immunizations, school health services,
nursing services, health education programs, well-being clinics, and home hazardous
waste disposal.
One of the most basic yet important pubic health functions is inspecting and licensing
restaurants and other food service establishments. A just released and highly critical
report by the state auditor finds that Massachusetts’s balkanized approach has put its
residents at serious risk of:
evolving disease pathogens and potential bio-terrorism activity [because]
inspection and other food protection activities…are not conducted with
adequate frequency, quality, standardization, coordination, or oversight…
The Commonwealth’s highly decentralized system, operated by generally
small town…health authorities with minimal oversight, coordination, or
technical assistance from state government has been characterized by the
FDA [Food & Drug Administration] as “unique” in the nation and has
presented concerns to federal food protection officials at least as far back
as 1982…[F]ood protection and other local health authority activities should
be restructured using a regionalization approach. 7
Based on a series of off-the-record discussions and interviews with public health
representatives from across the state, the most critical issues facing the state’s
fragmented public health system may be summarized as follows:
• staffing -i.e., no minimal staff credentialing, training, or size requirements;
• standards -i.e., no “best practices” model to be shared at local, regional, or state
levels
• size -i.e., too many small, under-staffed, under-funded LHDs unable to ensure
minimal public health services in their particular serving area
• growing expectations (e.g., emergency preparedness, pandemics, natural
disasters) but no increases in funding
• leadership -i.e., no state-wide vision (with public health delivery largely an ad
hoc response to individual crises rather than a proactive, systematized
undertaking)

Benefits of Consolidation:
The National Association of County & City Health Officials (“NACCHO”) has analyzed
the effectiveness of public health infrastructures. The following table, based on
NACCHO’s survey data, differentiates, on a percentage basis, a broad sampling of
services provided by county, city, city-county, and town-based health agencies. The
conclusion is quite overwhelming: LHDs serving larger population bases provide more
robust and comprehensive services than those serving small populations.
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Table 1: Percent of Services Provided by Local Public Health Departments:
Service:

County: City:

Childhood Immunizations
Cancer Screenings
Cardiovascular Screenings
Diabetes Screenings
Blood Pressure Screenings
Community Assessment
Community Outreach & Education
Communicable Disease Control
Epidemiology & Surveillance
Family Planning
Maternal Health
Prenatal Care
HIV/AIDS Testing & Counsel
STD Testing & Counsel
Tuberculosis Testing
Tuberculosis Treatment

98%
65
53
63
86
86
94
99
88
72
80
45
80
80
96
85

88%
41
53
44
82
75
89
89
80
36
60
34
43
60
87
48

City- Town:
County
99%
69
39
59
85
85
95
98
85
56
71
54
73
76
99
90

45%
22
28
33
55
52
62
68
56
9
24
18
11
6
45
17

MultiCounty
93%
74
68
66
81
87
95
100
92
70
88
59
72
69
90
71

Source: National Association of County & City Health Officials, Local Public Health Agency
Infrastructure: A Chartbook (October 2001): 26-35. http://archive.naccho.org/documents/chartbook.html.
(accessed March 18, 2007)

The study also examines LHD workforce trends and finds, not surprisingly, that town
LHDs have significantly smaller staffs, have more difficulty in attracting and retaining
qualified staff, are less able to provide regular staff training, and have more budget
constraints than their larger counterparts. 8
NACCHO is not alone in concluding that the performance of relatively small public
health delivery units suffers vis-à-vis that of their larger counterparts. Turnock notes
that, “Several reports going back more than 50 years have proposed extensive
consolidation of small LHDs because of perceived lack of efficiency and coordination of
services, inconsistent administration of public health laws, and inability of small LHDs to
raise adequate resources to carry out their prime functions effectively.” 9 In their study
of public health performance, Mays et al stress that:
Large public health systems may be able to realize economies of scale…by
spreading the fixed costs over larger populations of beneficiaries and taxpayers.
Large public health systems may also benefit from larger pools of organizations
in the community that may be enlisted to participate in public health activities…

9
Several previous studies have found evidence that larger public health systems
perform better than their counterparts in carrying out activities considered to be
important elements of public health practice. 10
In view of the role of size in the delivery of public health, the issue for Massachusetts is
how it might best restructure its heavily fragmented public health system into a more
regionalized system. In contrast to the formal administrative or political structure of a
town or county, a “region” would be a geographic entity comprising multiple towns that
come together to facilitate the provision of services to the combined populations. Such a
regional system would allow the fixed costs of public health infrastructure to be spread
over a larger population and tax base than possible with a single town. The benefits
would presumably be economies of scale, an expanded range of health services, and more
timely and efficient delivery.

Some Relevant Local Experience with Regionalization:
Notwithstanding its strong tradition of local autonomy and its highly fragmented
approach to public health, Massachusetts has had some experience with “regional”
approaches to healthcare. These include several multi-community collaborations
established (but no longer funded) to implement state-wide tobacco control initiatives.
More recent has been the creation of five emergency preparedness districts to manage the
distribution of federal funds made available post-9/11. There are also three other
prototypes, potentially more relevant, at least in terms of their broader-based public
health functionality.
The longest standing is the Nashoba Associated Boards of Health (“NABH”), created in
1931 under provisions of state statute permitting two or more towns to formally join
together into regional health districts to provide health services. 11 Fourteen
municipalities located in the central part of the state, cutting across two counties, and
accounting for some 90,000 people collectively use NABH as “agent” to assist their
elected boards of health in performing their respective functions. The individual health
boards retain autonomy, while Nashoba provides a wide range of public health services.
The agency and its 175 employees are funded by a combination of member town
assessments and user fees.
A different form of collaboration is the state’s only county-wide health department,
created in 1926 in Barnstable County, comprising the 15 towns located on Cape Cod,
representing some 200,000 year-round residents (and three-times more in the summer).
Like every other municipality in the state, each of Barnstable’s towns has its own LHD.
But in an arrangement that is unique in the state, the towns also share a county health
commissioner and staff, which provide supplemental, ad hoc advisory and support
services to the local communities on an as-needed basis. Overall funding is provided
through a 1 percent county sales tax.
A third type of collaboration is the Franklin Regional Council of Governments
(“FRCOG”), a voluntary association of 26 municipalities in the western part of the state
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covering approximately 10% of the state’s land mass and some 70,000 people. To help
the LHDs of member towns perform their normal range of public health functions, the
towns hire FRCOG’s regional health agent on an hourly basis. Expenses are covered by
a combination of user fees and town assessments.
Encouraging as they are, these collaborations collectively involve only about 5 percent of
the state’s 6.5 million residents living in fewer than one-fifth of its towns. Obviously
these prototypes need significant enlargement if they are to form the basis of any
meaningful state-wide regionalization scheme.

Potential Regionalization Models for Massachusetts:
There are at least four factors any effort to regionalize will need to keep in mind.
First is the matter of size. Despite their advocacy of large health systems, Mays
et al also found, “the performance improvements to be gained from
consolidation…diminish with size, with further gains appearing unlikely beyond
a threshold of approximately 500,000 residents.” 12 Second, creating regional
structures will be threatening to the many hundreds of dedicated and hardworking public health employees who serve the state’s 351 LHDs. Most
recognize the obvious short-comings of the current fragmented system, but they
are also fearful for their jobs; their buy-in will be vital to any successful
transition to regionalization.
Third, convincing towns to integrate public health delivery structures will be far
easier if long-standing traditions of local autonomy are respected. Otherwise,
staunch grass roots resistance is likely to thwart the effort. Finally, it will be
necessary to avoid a “one model fits all” mindset. Different types of miniregions are already at work, and there is no reason to adopt one model and
discard the others. Indeed, it would probably be wise to keep all of the
functioning mini-regions in tact and either duplicate them elsewhere and/or
create other types of regions.
As noted earlier, LHDs are most typically county-based. Besides Massachusetts,
however, there are some notable exceptions, including Connecticut, New Hampshire, and
New Jersey. Like Massachusetts, each has a long tradition of home rule and, thus, a
highly decentralized public health system. All have similar socio-economic and
geopolitical structures: a few large, relatively more prosperous metropolitan areas, with
the rest of the population residing in smaller, usually rural, often widely scattered and
often much poorer towns. For many of the same reasons that make regionalization a
logical next step for Massachusetts, each of these states has begun in recent years to
move toward regionalized public health structures. Their experiences are worth noting.
New Hampshire: The impetus for a more regional approach to public health in New
Hampshire was a grant provided by The Robert Wood Johnson and the W.K. Kellogg
Foundations. Its aim was to integrate local and state government with that of nongovernmental organizations like community health centers, hospitals, and social service
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organizations. Funding and technical assistance was initially provided to four groups, or
“coalitions,” covering 37 of the state’s towns. By combining the diverse expertise of
members, the focus of these coalitions has been to overcome local parochialism and
foster collaborations.
Although the grant funding has ended, the process and importance of partnering among
towns as well as other entities has gained increased state-wide acceptance, thanks to the
reality of limited local budgets, a growing appreciation of the efficiencies to be realized
through working together, and a state statute (similar to that in Massachusetts) allowing
local governments to form multi-town, or “district,” health departments. An additional
impetus has been the need to comply with federal emergency preparedness requirements.
Mainly by trial and error -trying to integrate school overlay districts, vaccination
distribution districts, and emergency preparedness districts -10 quasi-health districts
have been created, each focusing on prevention planning. Although still nascent, state
health officials are optimistic about the prospects for state-wide regionalization.
New Jersey: A task force funded a few years ago by The Robert Wood Johnson
Foundation (“RWJF”) called New Jersey’s public health system -comprising 566 cities
and towns as well as some 250 LHDs -“antiquated, outdated and ill-equipped to respond
to 21st century imperative,” criticizing it as one that “compromises efforts to provide
responsive and effective outreach, education and health services.” It went on to
recommend the town-based system be restructured into “coherent geographic entities”
able to provide more effective “reporting and responsiveness, consumer information
resources, training, and…services” able to meet both unanticipated emergencies as well
as ongoing health matters. 13
Prompted by the RWJF and then propelled by the events of 9/11, the state has actively
pursued policies aimed at consolidating LHDs and establishing state-wide practice
standards. The cornerstone has been the creation by the state health department of
agencies, or “links,” in each county to coordinate public health preparedness and
planning. An important part of this effort has been the recognition of the key role played
by LHDs in the delivery of the more traditional public health services, for example,
inspections and blood pressure screenings. Meanwhile, “health partnerships” have been
established within each county to provide a formal mechanism for convening local health
officers, the major purpose being to encourage collaborations in compliance with newly
established practice standards that emphasize the central role of integrated LHDs. 14
Connecticut: Like both Massachusetts and New Hampshire, Connecticut statute allows
formation of multi-town, or district, health districts. For the past four decades, as a
means of enhancing the quality and delivery consistency of its public health services
through standardization and economies of scale, the state has actively encouraged the
creation of these health districts. Post 9/11 concerns about the threat of bioterrorism have
added a new urgency to the effort. A key tool has been the use of financial incentives,
namely the annual allocation in state funds of approximately $2 per capita to towns
joining with others into health districts. To-date, some three-quarters of all municipalities
have joined into 19 separate health districts, ranging in size from two to 19 towns. The
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process continues, and officials anticipate there being a total of some 30 districts within
the next two decades.

Conclusion:
The paradigm has clearly shifted in New Hampshire, New Jersey, and Connecticut,
where concerted efforts are being made to marry the autonomy of local public health
delivery capacities with the advantages of greater coordination and synergy among
combined local agencies. Financial incentives have played a key role. Notwithstanding
the progress that has been made in all three, the path in each has been complicated and
delayed by the inevitable realities of funding shortages, personal political agendas, “not
invented here” reactions, and a host of other bureaucratic hindrances. But the positive
progress in these three traditional home rule states provides positive example to
Massachusetts that a meaningful transition to a less balkanized, more holistic approach to
public health is possible.
Any viable Massachusetts-wide regional structure will need to be multi-faceted and
eclectic, reflecting geopolitical and socio-economic divisions as well as the various
regional schemes already in existence. The Nashoba, Barnstable, and Franklin
collaborations are each providing a useful range of public health services throughout their
respective serving areas; other towns might be added to each as a means of further
leveraging economies of scale. The public health system of Boston (population 600,000)
is an already existing and viable operation, and several other urban centers could form the
anchor around which other regional clusters might be structured. Examples include such
geopolitical centers as Cambridge, Lowell, Springfield, and Worcester (populations in the
100,000 – 200,000 range), most or all of which have strong public health departments of
their own as well as broad networks of public and private health care providers, law
enforcement and public safety communities, and educational institutions. Finally, the
emergency preparedness regions could provide an overlay for a few additional public
health region regions.
Ultimately, making public health delivery more effective and efficient in Massachusetts
will entail more than negotiating and setting up regions across the state. Empowering
each region with the wherewithal to deliver a full range of public health services will
require addressing some fundamentally basic and still unresolved operating issues,
including:
• Staffing and training: how does the state move from a heavily volunteer structure
to one with a greater degree of professional training and accreditation, especially
in the more rural and less prosperous towns of the central and western state?
• Funding: what combination of local assessment, fee-based revenue, state funding,
Connecticut-type incentives, and federal grants is appropriate and sufficient to
ensure the broadest possible delivery capability?
• Services: should each region have the capacity to provide all of the same core
services, or will some inter-regional sharing be appropriate?
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The process of regionalization will be neither easy nor quick. But there can be little
doubt that Massachusetts is long overdue in providing its citizens a first-rate public health
system. And the timing may be opportune -rising concerns about global bio-terrorism,
potential pandemic outbreaks, and/or fears of a Katrina-type natural disaster now have
the added momentum of a newly elected governor, a newly appointed state public health
commissioner, and the prospect of other potential regionalization efforts.
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